

What is Care at Planetary Dimensions?

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What I'll be talking about tonight is a question concerning the problem of care in relation to the dimensions of the planetary. When I say 'problem' of care, I want to emphasize that the activity of caring, that is to care for someone or something or even some concept, is not self-evident. When it comes to the complex entanglements of technology, economies, infrastructures, politics, temporalities, ecosystems, atmospheres, diverse human cultures and non-human life-forms that inseparable in climate catastrophe, *how* to care in an accountable way is far from straightforward. While we see the term 'care' gaining increasing and welcome circulation, particularly as it derives from feminist discourses on reproductive and maintenance labour, there seems to remain a great deal of ambiguity as to just what makes up a caring act. What is it about a certain behavior or gesture that makes it recognizable as an act of care, and what is responsibility when it comes to the consequences of that care? How can care expand beyond the voluntary activity of an individual or small group into the deprivatized space of the impersonal; can a system care? The point I'd like to elaborate tonight, is that care cannot be divorced from epistemology or practices of knowing – epistemologies understood in the broadest possible sense, both in propositional terms (or knowledge *of* something) and tacit knowledge (a knowing through doing, or material practices). The starting point is to say that care can no longer be exclusively figured at an intimate scale of interpersonal relations when it concerns life and livability itself for over 7 billion humans, not to mention the necessary expansion of care to account for non-humans and the biospheric conditions that support, and embed life as such, but we ought to care these entities are cared for. Put simply, we cannot adequately care without 'better accounts of reality' that guide us not only on *how* to care, but how to do so accountably.

Deprivatising care from the sheer concern of the individual, or thinking care in an impersonal register within the multi-scalar crises of this moment, rests on the fact that we cannot directly care for everyone or everything, but politically and socially, we *ought* to care they are cared for. This insistence on an expanded picture of care, stands in ethical and epistemological opposition to the logic of the far right, who assert a perilous world-image of isolationism, and subtraction backed by relations ethno-familiar nationalisms. It is not only a vicious, morally bankrupt world-image, but an epistemologically erroneous one as well, as it refuses to acknowledge the reality of an unequally shared, yet nonetheless common planetary condition. Theirs is, quite falsely, a very small world. To care in an expanded way, world-pictures need to be commensurate with the proportions of complex reality today, which

means learning to care for unfamiliar relations, and knowing how to care at the scale of the impersonal. Ultimately this idea of impersonal care for the unknown, and the unfamiliar folds into a project for a solidarity *without* sameness.¹

The other part of the question concerns the planetary. More commonly we see the term 'planetary-scale' used in discourses on climate catastrophe and ubiquitous computation. I'd like to introduce an adjustment to this term in so far as the 'planetary-scale' is often deployed as interchangeable with the idea of systemic largeness, and while an imperfect cognitive modelling of the whole is necessary for thinking earth-social-systems, the term 'planetary-scale' tends to brush aside, or eclipse the local, including the inherent differences the notion of location entails. I'd like to propose 'planetary dimensionality' since it maintains fidelity to the need for modelling, as best as possible, complex earth-social systems, while introducing nested scales of co-existence within that totality, so as to create a framework for thinking difference and location *at*, *within* and in *relation to* this whole. With 'planetary dimensionality' there is a commitment to the accounting of the complex big-world, but the 'dimensionality' angle emphasizes the *composition* of that scale as produced by multiplied tangents of relation between bodies and things that shape contemporary coexistence. The idea with 'Planetary dimensionality' is to place prominence on the question of scale from the vantage-point of the *proliferation of interrelations*, rather than gazing from an impossible distance at scalar totality as such. What is crucial to highlight, however, is that this planetary dimensionality demands more adequate frames of reference (in spatial, perceptual, pragmatic and linguistic terms) to construct political orientation within and for its condition. I see care as interwoven with the invention of such frames of reference, the tools and techniques to make this planetary-dimension amenable to thought at all.

The clear risk in insisting of finding ways to navigate and construct co-existence at and for planetary dimensions, is the legitimate aversion to scale as such, given that globalization itself, is already an instance of deep and prolific interrelations. It's necessary, then, to outline why planetarity is not just globalization 2.0, also as a reminder to keep certain ideas in check along the way. In the introduction to *The Planetary Turn*, authors Elias and Moraru outline the concept of 'planetarity' as an ethical corrective to the homogenizing forces of globalization, as well as a field of study facing up to the geopolitical structural inadequacies of nation-state governance models to be accountable to globalizing forces – since legally speaking, there exists no such thing as a globally governable public body.² Elias and Moraru

¹ Passages of this introduction have been previously published in the essay: Patricia Reed, "Solidarity without Sameness," in *Para-Platforms: On the Spatial Politics of Right-Wing Populism*, eds.: Markus Miessen & Zoë Ritts (Berlin: Sternberg, 2019).

² Amy J. Elias and Christian Moraru, "Introduction," in *The Planetary Turn: Relationality and Geoaesthetics in the Twenty-First Century*, (Chicago: University of Northwestern Press, 2015), xi-xxxvi.

assert that 'planetarity' marks a perceptual shift from the globe as a financial-technocratic system, to the planet as world-ecology – a move they call 'worlding'. In this move a picture of the world as a commons is foregrounded. In his 2001 essay, "Turn to the Planet: Literature, Diversity, and Totality," Masao Miyoshi asserted the necessity for perceptual shifts to the planetary, due to the structural inadequacy of globalization to create uniform benefits, despite its homogenizing weight, since, in practice, these homogenizing forces actually generate great wealth asymmetries, and its mode of operation only benefits the privileged few. His claim was that there is only one site for maximizing inclusiveness, even if in the negative at present: namely the future of the common environment as a result of climate catastrophe. As he wrote, the goal of this perceptual shift is to:

"...nurture our common bonds to the planet – to replace the imaginaries of exclusionary familialism, communitarianism, nationhood, regionalism, "globalization," or even humanism, with the ideal of planetarianism. Once we accept this planet-based totality, we might for once agree in humility to devise a way to share with all the rest our only true public space and resources."³

Similarly, and we'll be returning to her later, the polymath Sylvia Wynter also wrote that as post-nuclear creatures now faced with climate crisis, for the first time in history, humankind is confronted with a common environment, even when in drastically different degrees of acuteness in crisis.⁴ Speaking broadly, and through various authors planetarity is inextricably bound to sensing a commonality in the world, because of interdependent relations.

As Elias and Moraru note while globalization is not the same as the more admirable 'globalism' that advocates a "life perspective and an epistemological stance toward a global ensemble wherein the parts communicate and must face up to their interdependence,"⁵ the global paradigm of accounting for earth-social systems has not been effective in negotiating the cultural, economic, political, and ethical effects of world interconnectivity. Introducing 'planetarity' is their terminological intervention to mark a clear difference in approach by foregrounding difference and hyper-relationality over sheer scale or scope of reach. Lastly to mark a contrast between the global and the planetary, it's important to note that planetarity is more than just an epistemological approach of eager inquisitiveness, it is "also in and of this world, its modality of being, describing both a phenomenological perception and a new theater of being whose novelty is becoming more conspicuous every day".⁶ In this way

³ Masao Miyoshi, "Turn to the Planet: Literature, Diversity, and Totality," in *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 2001), 283-297.

⁴ Sylvia Wynter, "A Ceremony Must Be Found: After Humanism," in *boundary 2*, vol. 12, spring-autumn 1984, 19-70.

⁵ Amy J. Elias and Christian Moraru, "Introduction," xx.

⁶ Amy J. Elias and Christian Moraru, "Introduction," xxiii.

planetarity is not just the description and knowledge of a system of interrelations, but is also a proposition for a mode of being. Through this description, we can note an important difference between simply knowing of planetary dimensionality, and co-existing in that knowledge, including its consequences manifest in practice.

It is significant that the insistence of planetarity as a mode of being *in* and *of* this world gestures to a situated accounting for it. Being *in* this world of planetary dimensionality, entails being located as some-body, some-where, some-when. If the ambition of planetary dimensionality is to include and not overwrite the local (as in globalization), what are the politics of location at these dimensions? How is the understanding of location changed at planetary dimensions? How is the picture of being situated in *this* world transformed by the conceptual integration of hyper-relationality across sites and temporalities – relations that may never be phenomenally available to sensation? What is the picture of the ‘site’ within which one is situated and how is that picture transformed because of co-existence within planetary dimensionality?

“The politics of location” emphasizes an accounting of (and accountability to) difference in order to avoid the tyranny of diminishing the world into a *reductive or flattened picture* of totality. Donna Haraway’s situated knowledge is a feminist *ethico-politico* epistemology driven by an underlying premise that building better accounts of reality is bound to the conscious locatability of knowing agents, specifically, their particular material, social and geo-historical circumstance shaping knowledge practices.⁷ These situated knowledge claims, as Haraway’s thesis goes, work reciprocally to engender a better accountability to and within reality (namely, politics and ethics). Her insistence on “positioning” or “locating” is not simply about revealing scientific bias, but elaborates on a mode of objectivity understood to be productively partial. And, since knowing derives from this partial objectivity, it is informed by the perspectival contingencies of a specified site. Situated knowledge lays the groundwork for an embodied/locatable objectivity that is simultaneously an account of the “radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects [and] for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for making meanings and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world”.⁸

Of relevance (and less discussed) in her canonical essay, is the recuperation of the “disparaged sensory system” of vision, urging for an embedded mode of seeing against the “conquering gaze” from nowhere, the gaze that has the power to inscribe “marked bodies”,

⁷ Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in *Feminist Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3. (Autumn, 1988), pp. 575–599.

⁸ Ibid.

while making an “unmarked claim”; possessing the power to “represent while escaping representation”.⁹ Making claims on vision from a situated perspective, is required, according to Haraway, in order to become “accountable for what we learn how to see”, where the fight over the judgement of ‘valid’ knowledge is equal to a struggle over “*how to see*”.¹⁰ For Haraway there is little to no separation between politics and ethics from epistemological endeavours – there is no detached innocence to be had – and that partial objectivity is achieved through the weaving together of locatable knowledges, in “webs of connection called solidarity in politics and shared conversations in epistemology”.¹¹

The value of this “situational locating” in the world is that it preserves contextual particularity and difference. There are three important points I’d like to underscore from Haraway as vital to uphold before addressing the transformation of situatedness within planetary dimensionality. 1) the importance of grappling with knowledge claims as inseparable from their consequences in reality (that is, the non-innocent materialization of knowledge in practice – primarily through technologies, both politically and ethically). 2) the bond between accounts of reality and accountability to it, that is, accountability to, and care for its possible future histories. And 3) the insistence on the possibility of ‘betterment’ for both accounts of, and accountability to reality.¹²

Where this situational insistence offers less guidance, is in approaching the coherence of a generalized, better account—that is, how all those “conversations” or relays between relational locations *come together* in mutually influential ways as a ‘faithful account of reality’. How can situatedness be formulated with respect to planetary dimensionality, by relations both near and distant, by those which are immediately perceivable and those which are not? At planetary dimensionality locations or sites not only exist in, and have relations to broader contexts, but this relationality feeds back and partially shapes them. Meaning that the site of situatedness is indivisibly co-constituted by extra-local relations. This in no way erases the concretely differential *experience* of located embodiment, but offers a more extensive, local/extra-local picture of “being situated” in view of the path dependencies that make-up planetary dimensionality. Here we can say that location is partially defined by a specificity of experience, but it is irreducible to that which can be directly experienced.¹³

If the struggle in situated knowledge is not only over *how to see*, but how to be accountable to what one sees from an embodied position at some site in *this* world, how does this

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Passages of this section have been previously published in the essay: Patricia Reed, “Freedom and Fiction,” in *Glass Bead Journal*, Site: 02, 2019. <https://www.glass-bead.org/article/freedom-and-fiction/?lang=enview>

¹³ Ibid.

boundedness to a 'site' not end up reinforcing habits or customs of seeing? Patterns of seeing that today tend to obscure nested, planetary relationality? With situatedness are we forever bound to *this* world, with no possibility of constructing otherworlds? How can the situating of thought provide the tools to see differently, that is, to learn to see from a shifted perspectival location or position? Haraway already noted that positioning within situated knowledge is not immobile, while leaving the details of that repositioning fairly vague. This point needs to be stressed if an elaboration of situatedness is not to fall into the static trap of equating immediate, given experience with knowledge; of monumentalizing the site as permanent, nor of the mere reproduction of habituated perspectives. What I'd like to stress is that at planetary dimensionality the boundaries of defining what a site is are not straightforward, and it is no longer sufficient to determine them based on what presents itself as given to us exclusively from a human bio-sensory spatial experience.

To define location—or to define something as “local” or as a particular ‘site’—requires the implicit articulation of a threshold. The term is usually taken as self-evident, yet it is one that implies specific historical and cultural spatial norms, scales, modes of human self-conception, perspectives, and abstractions at work—ones that are rarely made explicit, drawing a border between a general territory and a particular instance.¹⁴ At work here in this apparent self-evidence of what a location is, of this implicit demarcating the spatial parameters of a site, is what Foucault named as the *episteme*.

This is the historical-discursive condition underwriting the possibility of any knowledge. The episteme structures the spontaneous cultural experience of the relations between things, the classification of those relations (namely the organization of sameness and difference), and the principles by which “they must be considered”.¹⁵ Effectively, the episteme is the naturalization of a particular mode of ordering, a code governing how the world is approached, and the ways in which knowledge of those codes is arranged. The episteme is what allows for the bracketing of broad historical periods, where different epistemes mark moments of historical discontinuity, or a paradigm shift – where it is simply no longer possible to think a certain thought, or reason the world in the same way. Notably, Foucault described the episteme as the *site* upon which knowledge is primarily referenced – a different angle on the site compared to Haraway's, since it is a broadly shared historical one, but one that imposes constraints and limitations as to what counts as knowledge. The naming of the episteme, is an attempt to grasp “the implicit systems which determine our most familiar

¹⁴ *Passage* has been previously published in the essay: Patricia Reed, “Orientation in a Big World: On the Necessity of Horizonless Perspectives,” in *e-flux Journal*, #101, 2019. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/101/273343/orientation-in-a-big-world-on-the-necessity-of-horizonless-perspectives/>

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of Human Sciences*, (London: Routledge, 2005), xxvi.

behaviour [...] to show their formation, the constraint they impose upon us”, and, in so doing, attempt “to show how one could escape.”¹⁶

Importantly, Sylvia Wynter extended the episteme principle to the construction of human self-conception, drawing an important link between the ways the human has been culturally/historically understood and the creation of knowledge regimes that reflect the so-perceived ‘nature’ of that self-conception. Because of this link between a particular, regionally specific human self-concept and possibilities for knowledge deriving from it, Wynter stresses that any substantial social transformation necessarily requires a paradigm shift in the discursive framework by which a certain concept of being human is devised and later practiced.¹⁷ In what Wynter names as ‘genres of being human’, this idealised human figure operates like a template for human adaption (setting borders of inclusion/exclusion in the process), an idealisation whose modes of reproduction are underwritten by social organizational structures incentivizing or rewarding adaptation to this idealised concept.¹⁸ This positive feedback loop, or what she (following Frantz Fanon) calls the sociogenic principle,¹⁹ effectively naturalizes a particular model of human idealisation, whilst othering all beings and entities not in conformance with its ontologizing and domesticating force.

Just as the historical-discursive episteme is often only silently practice this genre of being human idealisation is assumed as a sacrosanct essence of human self-reference, one that shapes knowledge claims in accordance with the ‘natural fact’ of that human concept-template. This habit of thought she identifies as ‘genre-specific orders of truth’, or adaptive truths.²⁰ Due to this adaptive, genre-*conforming* ‘truth’ process, Wynter (self-)critically notes the role intellectuals play in replicating these genre-specific orders of truth (as opposed to the pursuit of truth in general).²¹ Whether via Foucault’s episteme, or through Wynter’s human self-concept both thinkers set their sights on paradigmatic social transformation, by looking to primordial, naturalized frames of reference for thinking the world, that purposefully determine what is understood as legitimate, good, true, natural, relevant or necessary. It goes without saying that today those categories of the legitimate, good, true, natural, relevant or necessary are in urgent need of reconsideration.

¹⁶ John K. Simon, “A Conversation with Michel Foucault” in *Partisan Review* 38, 1971, 192–201.

¹⁷ Sylvia Wynter, “A Ceremony Must Be Found: After Humanism.”

¹⁸ Sylvia Wynter, “No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues,” in *Forum N.H.I.: Knowledge for the 21st Century*, vol.

¹⁹ Sylvia Wynter, “Towards the Sociogenic Principle: Fanon, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience, of “Identity” and What it’s Like to be “Black,” in *National Identities and Socio-political Changes in Latin America*, eds.: M. F. Durán-Cogan and A. Gómez-Moriana, (New York: Routledge, 2001) 30–66.

²⁰ Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for our Species,” in *Sylvia Wynter: Being Human as Praxis*, ed. K. McKittrick, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 32.

²¹ Sylvia Wynter, “No Humans Involved: An Open Letter to My Colleagues.”

Geopolitical domination is enacted through this self-reinforcing, reproductive mechanism when the regional-specificity of a particular episteme/human-concept is inflated and imposed extra-regionally, in material and conceptual ways. This is a brief account of unilateral globalization.²² It is through the inflated expansion of regionally-specific episteme where the human has also been ontologized by an ever-persistent, nineteenth century European human-concept, manifesting in what Wynter calls a liberal monohumanism, as *homo oeconomicus*.²³ Such an inflated genre of being human has generated “the lived and racialized categories of the rational and irrational, the selected and the dysselected, the haves and the have-nots as asymmetrical naturalized racial- sexual human groupings that are [...] increasingly subordinated to a figure that thrives on accumulation.”²⁴ Today this monohumanist-human figure domesticates at a total scale, placing non-conforming (or non-performing) bodies or entities, conceptually, politically, and socially, outside the enclosure of a referent ‘we’ of humanity. A particular ‘we’ in accordance with idealised human genre-concept that has become naturalized as a generic whole, when in practice, this ‘we’ is nothing more than the reinforcement of an adaptive truth in accordance with a particular genre of being human. The perilous blind spot is not simply that this ‘we’ is partial, but because that regionally specific, referent ‘we’ is treated as isomorphic with the entirety human species.²⁵ Such is the a-historical monohumanist ‘we’ of the anthropos in the Anthropocene. Now faced with climate crisis, where humanity is confronted with a common environment, even when in drastically different degrees of acuteness in crisis, it is a confrontation demanding the invention of new genres of being human, or modes of self-troping “made to the measure of the planetary”.²⁶ The question is, how can genres of human self-troping made to the measure of the planetary not simply reiterate the inflationary template of the monohumanist-human, that human-idealization responsible for the very production of this now common environment?

Such a question echoes an earlier dilemma: If situated knowledge is required to preserve locatable difference within planetary dimensionality, it is bound to a ‘site’. The question is, does this tethering to a site, not end up reinforcing habits of seeing, productive only of ‘adaptive truths’ of a given historical-discursive condition? How can situated thought lead to modes of knowing, other than those determined by historical-discursive constraints? Lastly, and crucially, if situated knowledge is concerned with better accounts of the world in order to

²² Yuk Hui, “Cosmotechnics as Cosmopolitics,” in *e-flux Journal* #86, Nov. 2017. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/86/161887/cosmotechnics-as-cosmopolitics/>

²³ Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for our Species.”

²⁴ Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for our Species,” 10.

²⁵ Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick, “Unparalleled Catastrophe for our Species,” 24. Previously published in: Patricia Reed, “Freedom and Fiction”.

²⁶ David Scott, Preamble to Sylvia Wynter, “The Re-Enchantment of Humanism,” (David Scott, Interviewer), in *Small Axe* 8, 2000, 119–207. Retrieved here: <https://libcom.org/library/re-enchantment-humanism-interview-sylvia-wynter>

be better accountable to it, how can it think other, better worlds that are not locatable, nor actualized in the here and now, for which there is presumably no actualized or existing site? How is a vision of them to be positioned as part of a broader struggle for new historical-discursive configurations?

Understanding the implied spatial abstractions in a term like “local” provokes a helpful moment to scrutinize certain assumptions baked into our own historical-discursive situation, and begin to grasp the constraint they impose upon possibilities for seeing the world, and ask how we may nurture an escape from those constraints as a gesture of care for planetary dimensionality. What is the border condition of location or a site, and at what threshold does the local stop being local? From which perspectival position are these thresholds drawn?²⁷

When we complicate what a location or a site is at planetary dimensionality, by insisting on its interconnection and inseparability from other locations and sites, there are consequences for human positioning as a result. On the one hand, human individuals are in this world somewhere, some when, in some body and experience it differently in concrete ways. On the other hand, humans are also embedded in abstract, discursive-historical frameworks that determine conceptual self-understanding and modes of praxis as a result. The argument here, is that the positioning required of situatedness within planetary dimensionality needs to be figured as a stereoscopic picture between both modes of self-apprehension; as a continuum between an abstract human concept and concrete human experience.

Wynter broadly defines the human as a hybrid bio/mythoi creature, introducing a crucial dynamic into the picture of the human as partly artificial and fictitious. For a genre of being human made to the measure of the planetary, Wynter demands an intervention into the story that humans are purely biological creatures “motivated primarily by the imperative common to all organic species of securing the material basis of their existence; rather than by the imperative of securing the overall conditions of existence.”²⁸ Without this *historical-discursive* fiction, without this self-storytelling there is simply no *homo oeconomicus* to be self-troped into actuality. Fictions have consequences, materially, politically, ethically and epistemically, which is precisely why the need to account for them is crucial.²⁹

However the fictions of a new genre of being human may be invented, answering to planetary-dimensional questions, in the very least, demands proportionate responses, big-

²⁷ Passage has been previously published in the essay: Patricia Reed, “Orientation in a Big World: On the Necessity of Horizonless Perspectives,” in *e-flux Journal*, #101, 2019. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/101/273343/orientation-in-a-big-world-on-the-necessity-of-horizonless-perspectives/>

²⁸ Sylvia Wynter, “No Humans Involved,” 49. Previously published in: Patricia Reed, “Freedom and Fiction”.

²⁹ Previously published in: Patricia Reed, “Freedom and Fiction”.

world responses that can account for, and be accountable to plurality, complexity and systems of human and non-human interdependence, without the false (and oftentimes vicious) cognitive comforts of reduction.³⁰ It's here I'd like to point out a crucial difference between the inflation of a situated concept to the scale of a big-world, versus situating concept-creation within a big-world perspective.

A small world perspective can be understood as a subtractive relation to reality where the borders of positional location are 'self-evidently' drawn in conformance with the accustomed proportions of ready-at-hand, immediate human experience. A big world perspective does not, in any way disavow small world localization – it's a necessary position of departure, but it insists on the insufficiency of such positioning in isolation to address (and be accountable to) planetary-dimensionality. Big world positioning demands a nested account of situatedness, where 'location' is no longer figured as self-evidently enclosed, despite its differential status, but is rather imagined as a synthesis between immediate/concrete surroundings and the dimensional vectors of relation that shape it. A big world perspective is not driven by a hubristic ambition towards an illusory 'perfect' vision of totality, these perspectives, like any other are always partial. The ambition is, rather, to introduce a better accounting for the transformation of space and dimensionality at this scale, in order to avoid the scalar pitfalls of conflating the part with the whole, and deploying that misgiving as a navigational marker.

If the 'small-world' perspective indexes the tendency for inflating partiality, the 'big-world' perspective, at least provisionally for now, marks the rejection of this tendency not only on ethical grounds, but epistemological ones as well, since the small-world perspective is simply an unfaithful account of reality. Thinking within big-world perspective is an ambitiously humble exercise, demanding reasoned nihilism take aim at given narratives of human centrality, both at the micro-level of the individual as primary agent (coinciding with the 'economic genre of being human'), as well as the macro level of the species. As an exercise in self-relativization, this humility is not about luxuriating in the turbulence of a decentred narrative picture, it is, rather, to see this non-centrality as a seed for new genres of being human, to learn how to see accountably from those vistas, and how to make this big-world condition amenable to sensation and intelligibility. The necessary geometries, narrations, epistemologies, images and interfaces (in both operational and linguistic form) to make this big world available to navigation seem to be in a nascent state, if existing at all. This is not a

³⁰ Previous published in: Patricia Reed, "Making Ready for a Big World," in Making & Breaking, Issue 1, 2019. <https://makingandbreaking.org/article/patricia-reed-making-ready-for-a-big-world/>

dissuasion from the proportion of labor ahead, but a note of optimism infused with a realist bent.³¹

To close, it is crucial to highlight an important assertion discussed by Marina Vishmidt, who wrote that care and maintenance labour needs to be seen as “the basis of a politics of transformation and not of a realism of survival”.³² To conclude through her insight we can infer that care is not only bound to sites and immediate situations in the here and now, but can be extended to the realm of the unactual, towards the care for transformed otherworlds not yet actualized as discursive-material sites. To care *for*, *with* and *at* planetary dimensionality, requires care for it’s possible history – one that of yet knows no home.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Marina Vishmidt, “Pure Maintenance,” in *South as a State of Mind*, #10, 2018, 80– 91. Thanks to Hannah Gregory for bringing this essay to my attention.